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Is Soy Milk? 
 The Economics of the Soy Milk Market 
 
The U.S. food sector is going through rapid transformations in terms of new 
product introduction and innovations.  New soy based food products are leading the way 
in changing the landscape of available choices to consumers.   This rapid expansion of 
product spaces has taken place concomitantly with an increase in public policy concerns 
on issues of standardization, labeling, and associated consumer welfare.  In this paper we 
explore these broader issues in the context of a specific product introduction, the 
introduction of soy milk in the U.S. market.   
Soy milk is fast emerging as potential competitor for cow’s milk in the U.S. 
market.  The debate and fight over soy milk pits dairy producers and their associations 
against their counterparts in the crop/grain world.  Controversies related to the 
competition between soy and dairy milk have been in the major news outlets for quite 
some time.  For example, last year one of ABC’s 20/20 news shows devoted half an hour 
to discussing the politics of the soy and dairy milk war.   
The purpose of the research is to analyze the economics of a major recent 
innovation in the U.S. fluid milk market: the introduction of soy milk.  Are consumers 
willing to pay extra for soy milk?  If so, how much are they willing to pay?  Are soy and 
cows milk substitutes or complements in the market? 
Among the key policy relevant issues to be addressed in this research are:  
1.  Market separability between soy and animal milks: There is a key labeling issue 
for policy makers as to whether soy milk should be labeled as “milk” or whether   2
the milk designation should be reserved for animal’s milk or not.  Much of the 
relevance of this debate hinges on whether soy milk competes against cow’s milk 
or serves a separate consumer market. 
2.  Market structure in the soy and cows’ milk markets.  The soy milk retail market 
contains both large integrated agribusiness firms, such as Archer Daniels Midland 
and Cargill, and a significant number of small specialized firms, such as Eden 
Soy, focusing only on the soy milk market.  In addition a major competitor in the 
cows’ milk market, Suiza/Dean Foods, sells in both the cows’ and soy milk 
markets.  Understanding the interactions between these milk types will improve 
our understanding of whether trade in both milk markets exhibits the hallmarks of 
anti-competitive behavior.   
3.  Federal Subsidy Issues: The federal farm bills subsidize both the milk and 
soybean industries, if the growth in soy milk is due to pressure from soy 
subsidies, but the growth in soy milk causes cows’ milk prices to go down, the 
federal government is in essence competing against itself.  This research can 
demonstrate whether such a scenario is the case currently or likely to be in the 
future as the market for soy milk explains. 
The present study uses revealed preferences of consumers to study the consumer 
valuations of and associated benefits from soy milk, basing its analysis on scanner data of 
fluid milk purchases in 12 key US metropolitan markets from IRI Inc.
4  Of the 12 cities, 4 
are in the West census region, 4 in the South census region, 3 in the Midwest, and 1 in the 
Northeast region.  Due to disclosure agreements with IRI we cannot mention the cities or 
                                                 
4 A Chicago based marketing research firm specializing in archiving and analyzing store and household 
level scanner data.   3
brands included in our analysis.  Instead these cities are identified by US census regions 
as: West census region cities (WT_1,.., WT_4); South census region cities (SO_1,.., 
SO_4); Midwest region cities (MW_1,.., MW_3); and Northeast region city (NE_1). The 
database provides detailed brand level information on volume sold, total revenue 
generated, number of units sold, and the extent of merchandising and price reduction.  
This data allows a simultaneous exploration of consumer willingness to pay, market 
structure, and the conduct of firms in these markets.  As a result we are able to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the U.S. retail fluid milk market by types (i.e., skim, whole, 
flavored, milkshakes and soy milk).   
The use of revealed preference data has a number of obvious advantages over the 
previous survey and experimental based literature on food labeling and marketing of 
specialty products (see e.g., Armand-Balmat, Teisel et al., Huffman et al.).  First and 
foremost it relies on consumer’s actual behavior rather than their behavior in 
experimental or survey settings.  Second data is available for 12 major metropolitan cities 
spanning U.S. regions and the different types of cities: old industrial city, mainstream 
fast-growing city, counterculture fast-growing city, etc.  Thus one can make some 
reasonable inferences about the population as a whole from this data.  A third advantage 
is we observe consumer responses both at the time they are introduced to a product and 
their subsequent purchase pattern once they are used to the product in the market.  
Having this time series avoids potential biases inherent in the experimental and survey 
literature when consumers are faced with a product they have never seen or tasted before.   
The goals of this paper are to: 
-  Identify empirically the extent of market penetration of soy milk products.   4
-  Estimate price premiums and market shares of soy milk in each of the 12 markets. 
-  Estimate benefits to consumers from improved choice sets (e.g., from having only 
cows milk to having soy milk) using highly flexible quadratic almost ideal demand 
system (Q-AIDS) framework as in Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).  We use 
full information maximum likelihood estimation techniques to estimate the demand 
systems for four regionally and geographically representative markets after 
controlling for price and expenditure endogeneity as in Dhar, Chavas and Gould 
(2002).  
-  Estimate the impact of soy milk on the competitive structure of the fluid milk 
markets. 
-  Based on the estimates we extrapolate to the impacts of soy milk on the U.S. fluid 
milk markets.  
The paper is organized as follows.  First, we describe the data and present 
descriptive analysis of the milk products we analyze: skim/lowfat, whole, flavored, and 
soy milks and milkshakes as well as the 12 markets. The reduced form analysis of this 
section provides insights and guidelines for the structural demand analysis in the section 
that follows.  In Section 2 we provide a detailed demand system specification and our 
estimation methods to generate consistent parameter estimates.  In Section 3, we present 
our empirical specification of the demand, price and expenditure systems.  Econometric 
results and post estimation measures such as price and expenditure elasticities, and 
welfare impacts of different types of milk are then presented in Section 4.  A conclusion 
drawing policy implications for USDA labeling and regulation policy follows. 
   5
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics: 
We use retail scanner data from Information Resources Inc. (IRI) to conduct 
exploratory market analyses and estimate our demand system.  Our scanner database, 
which was collected so as to be representative of the markets in our 12 cities, provides 
brand level weekly milk price and sales data starting from 3/9/1997 to the week ending 
2/24/2002.  We augment this database with milk price data from the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order (FMMO).  The demographic variables come from the U.S. Census.  The 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis are summarized below.  
  The simplest method for understanding for how soy milk fits into the overall milk 
market is an investigation of retail price differentials.  Tables 1 and 2 present the average 
prices and market shares for the five milk types in our study by city of sale and overall.  
On average, price differences between soy and skim or whole milk are about $5.00 per 
gallon.   There are relatively few apparent differences between cities in prices, however 
market shares do differ by an order of magnitude.  A western city, WT_1, has the lowest 
prices for soy milk, but it does not have the highest market penetration for soy milk 
which occurs in NE_1 where nearly 1% of the market is soy milk.     
Over the 5 years from 1997 to 2002 prices for soy milk dropped 20% which is in 
contrast to an increase of 16% in skim milk, 14% for whole milk, 21% for flavored milk, 
and 35% for milkshakes.  This asymmetric pattern of price inflation dropped the price 
differential between soy milk and skim milk from $5.80 to $3.73 per gallon (122% of the 
skim milk price).  Such price differentials show significant willingness-to-pay among 
certain consumers for the attributes of soy milk.  These averages, however, represent 
premiums consumers who bought these types of milk paid but do not identify either the   6
effect of competition between unlabeled and newly labeled milk or the effects on 
consumers from having broader choice sets of labeled milk.  These issues are analyzed in 
the next section. 
   
2. A Consumer Demand System for Multiple Milk Types 
In this section we first describe our choice of demand system. Then we derive the 
analytical form of the post estimation measures: elasticities and welfare effects.  We 
specify the demand system at the level of weekly milk purchases in each of the study 
cities over the study period.  Since we are constrained by the available data, this method 
implicitly assumes a multi-stage household budgeting process in which milk expenditures 
are weakly separable from other purchases.   We believe this is a reasonable assumption 
given that milk is a necessity and there exists no close substitute of fluid milk.
5  In 
estimating disaggregate demand systems such an assumption of weak separability is a 
necessity at some level, since it is almost impossible to estimate a full demand system 
that includes all products with disaggregated product level data.  For example, even 
studies in the literature that test for weak separabilty implicitly assume that weak 
separabilty holds at some stage of the consumer budgeting process (see e.g., Eales and 
Unnevehr,  Nayga and Capps).  Thus like the rest of the demand system literature, we are 
constrained by the completeness of disaggregated data necessary to make interesting 
inferences at the product level and need to assume weak separability at the level of milk 
versus all other household purchases.   
                                                 
5For detailed discussion on weak separability and estimation of disaggregated product or brand level 
demand systems please refer to Dhar, Chavas, and Gould. They reject weak separability in the context of 
carbonated beverages but they find that controlling for the endogeneity of prices and expenditures as done   7
 
2a. Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System: 
To specify demand for different types of milk we use the quadratic almost ideal 
demand system (Q-AIDS).  A non-parametric analysis of Engel curves in Dhar and Foltz 
suggests that the relationship between per capita expenditure on any milk type and total 
per capita expenditure on milk is non-linear.  Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) have 
shown that in the presence of such non-linear Engel curves use of a rank 2 demand 
system such as the standard AIDS model is inappropriate.  The Q-AIDS is the best 
available exactly aggregable demand system to capture any non-linear impacts of price 
and expenditure changes on demand.  The demand system underlying the Q-AIDS is of 
rank 3, which, as proved in Gorman, is the maximum possible rank for any demand 
system that is linear in functions of income.  Unlike the AIDS model (Deaton and 
Muelbauer, 1980a,b) and the exactly aggregable Translog model of Jorgenson, Lau, and 
Stoker, the Q-AIDS model permits goods to be luxuries at some income level and 
necessities at others.     
In order to derive a Q-AIDS demand system let e(p, u) be the household 
expenditure function, where 
n R p + + ∈  is the (n×1) price vector of the (n×1) vector of 
consumption goods 
n R q + ∈ .  Under the almost ideal class of demand systems, 
[]
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in this application affects the test for weak separability such that null hypothesis of weak separabilty can in 
some cases be accepted.     8
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M , the parameters (α, β, τ, Γ) satisfy the restrictions:  
α
T 1n = 1, β
T1n = 0, τ
T 1n = 0, Γ 1n = 0n (homogeneity/adding up), and Γ
T = Γ (symmetry). 
Letting x> 0 be household expenditure, the Marshallian demand specification (with 
q1,…,qn quantity demanded )  in terms of expenditures shares w ≡ (p1 q1




(1)  w= α + Γ ln p + β [ln x – ln a(p)] + τ [ln x – ln a(p)]
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In order to facilitate the empirical implementation one can also specify this 
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where p = (p1, …, pN)’ is a (N×1) vector of prices for q, and wilt = (pilt qilt/xlt) is the budget 
share for the i
th commodity consumed in the l
th city at time t.  The term Plt , the price 
index can be expressed as:  
ln(Plt) = δ + ∑ =
N
1 m αm ln(pmlt) + 0.5 ∑ =
N
1 m ∑ =
N
1 j γmj ln(pmlt) ln(pjlt). 
The above Q-AIDS specification (equation 2) can be modified to incorporate the 
effects of socio-demographic variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt) on consumption behavior, where Zklt 
is the k
th socio-demographic variable in the l
th city at time t, k = 1, …, K.  This method, 
demographic translating, allows demographic differences to shift both the intercept and   9
elasticity parameters.  Under demographic translating, αi is assumed to take the following 
form: αilt = α0i+ ∑ =
K
1 k λik Zklt, i = 1, …, N.  
 
2b. Using Q-AIDS to analyze substitution between milk types: 
From estimating a Q-AIDS model, one can recover detailed compensated and un-
compensated own and cross price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, and measures of 
consumer welfare.  The own and cross price elasticities allow us to analyze the 
substitution behavior of consumers between the different types of milk as a way of 
describing consumer demand for labeled milk. Together these elasticities describe the 
patterns of consumer willingness to pay for labeled milk. 
Differentiating the demand system (equation 1) with respect to lnp and lnx and 
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− = where  ij δ  is the Kronecker delta.  We use the Slutsky equation to calculate 
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2c. Using Q-AIDS to Measure Benefits from Labeled Milk:   10
Since soy milk was relatively new to the general milk market during this data’s study 
period, one can think of measuring consumer valuation of soy milk as measuring the 
benefits of a new product introduction.  New products have two effects: on the one hand 
they raise competition, potentially lowering prices of all related goods; on the other they 
provide increased choice to consumers which according to standard consumer theory 
should have a non-negative effect on consumer utility.  Since we observe markets both 
with and without soy milk we can use this variation in the data along with the Q-AIDS 
model to identify key components of consumer benefits from the product.     
The standard approach in the literature on product introductions (see e.g., Hausman; 
and Hausman and Leonard) measures the total effect on consumers from the introduction 
of new products as the difference in the consumers’ expenditure function before and after 
the introduction, i.e., the compensating variation, CV.  Holding utility constant at the 
post-introduction level, compensating variation can be described as: 
(3)  () ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 1 1 , , , , , , u r p p p e u r p p e CV N N
∗ − = ,        
where p1 is the vector of post-introduction prices of the competing products, pN is the 
post-introduction price of the new product(s), p0 is the pre introduction prices, r is a price 
vector for products outside the industry, and u1 is the post-introduction utility level.  The 
function pN
*(p) defines the ‘virtual’ price for the new products, which is the reservation 
price at which demand for the new product would be zero given the prices of the other 
products.   
This total benefit to consumers can be decomposed into two components: 
(4a)  () ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) () ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , u r p p p e u r p p p e u r p p p e u r p p e CV N N N N
∗ ∗ ∗ − + − = ,   
which can be re-written as:    11
(4b)  ) ( CE VE CV + − = .  
Here the first term (VE) represents a variety effect, implying the change in consumer 
welfare due to the availability of the new products(s), holding the prices of the existing 
brands constant at the pre-introduction level.  The second term is the competitive effect 
(CE), which represents the consumer welfare due to the change in the prices of existing 
brands after the introduction.  The impact of the competitive effect can be positive or 
negative based on the nature of competition between firms producing the products 
originally on the market and those that have entered the market.   
The variety effect can be estimated indirectly out of the parameters of the Q-AIDS 
demand system as the area under the estimated demand curve between actual 
price/consumption points and the price that sets consumption equal to zero.  The 
competitive effect can be estimated indirectly from the milk price series using the effects 
of adding new soy milk brands as a proxy for the introduction effect.
6  The empirical 
techniques for estimating these effects are described below. 
 
3. Estimation Procedures for the Demand System 
  A number of previous studies have found problems of endogeneity of price and 
expenditure in estimating demand systems using aggregate scanner data such as those 
used in this study (see e.g., Dhar, Chavas and Gould, 2003).  In order to account for 
potential price and expenditure endogeneity, our estimation procedure for the Q-AIDS 
demand system, equation (2), includes an additional set of equations that simultaneously 
                                                 
6 Note that it is also possible to generate indirect estimates of the competitive effect from the Q-AIDS 
system if one is willing to assume that the milk processors are engaged in a Bertrand competition game.  
Since part of the purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether or not there is any competition between soy 
and cows milk it would be counter productive to assume a specific type of competition.    12
estimate the determinants of milk prices and milk expenditures as functions of exogenous 
variables.  We estimate our demand equations, reduced form price equations, and 
expenditure equation using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation 
method.
7 Due to adding up restrictions of the Q-AIDS demand system we drop one 
demand equation and estimate a system with 4 demand equations, 5 reduced form price 
equations, and 1 expenditure equation.     
The reduced form price equations used to control for price endogeneity for each 
milk type (skim/lowfat, whole, flavored, milkshake, and soy milks) are specified to 
capture the supply side of the price formation mechanism.  The price equation for the i
th 
commodity in the l
th city at time t is:  
(5) p ilt = f(supply/demand shifters). 
In equation (5) supply/demand shifters would include variables to describe raw material, 
product manufacturing, and packaging costs.   Following Blundell and Robin we specify a 
reduced form expenditure equation where household expenditure in the l
th city at time t is 
a function of median household income and a time trend: 
(6) M lt = f(time trend, income).   
Given these reduced form specifications for the price and expenditure equations, we 
estimate jointly (2), (5) and (6) by FIML.  The resulting parameter estimates have 
desirable asymptotic properties (Amemiya). 
  To control for city specific variations, we modify the Q-AIDS specification with 
demographic translating variables (Z1lt, …, ZKlt).  Our AIDS model also incorporates a set 
of four seasonal dummy variables for each city along with socio-demographic variables.  
                                                 
7 An alternative is the GMM framework developed by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbell. 
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In order to maintain theoretical consistency of the AIDS model, the following restrictions 
are applied to the demographic translating parameter α0i: 
(7)  α0i = ∑ =
4
1 r r irD d ,  1
4
1 = ∑ = r ir d , i = 1,…, N,  
where dir is the parameter for the i
th brand associated with the seasonal dummy variable 
Dr for the r
th season.  Note that as a result, our demand equations do not have intercept 
terms. 
 
4. Empirical Specifications 
4a. Price Specification 
Most recent studies of differentiated products have modeled price as a function of 
supply and demand shifters, assuming these shifters are exogenous to the price formation 
mechanism (e.g., Cotterill, Franklin and Ma; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar; and Kadiyali, 
Vilcassim and Chintagunta).  For milk products, raw milk prices account for 62% of the 
retail milk price and thus can be used as a reasonable proxy for a large part of the 
variability in manufacturing costs (U.S. G.A.O.).  Other important retailing and 
processing costs we include in the price formation equation provide proxies for labor, 
merchandising, and packaging costs.  We therefore specify the retail price functions, 
equation (5), with raw milk price, marketing and other product characteristics as 
explanatory variables: 
(8)
[ ] ilt i ilt i ilt i lt i ilt i ilt i i ilt UPV PRD p wage p C p C p 6 5 1 4 3
2
2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) _ ln( ) _ ln( ) ln( θ θ θ θ θ θ θ + + + + + + = −
    14
where pilt is the retail price of milk type i, in city l and at time t.  As a measure of milk 
costs, C_plt is the price of announced cooperative class 1 milk price in city l at time t.  
Similarly, wagelt is the wage rate in city l at time t and pilt-1 is the lagged retail price.  As a 
measure of the average size of purchases UPVilt is the unit volume of the i
th product in the 
l
th city at time t.  For example, if a consumer purchases only one gallon bottles of a brand, 
then unit volume for that brand will be just one.  Conversely, if this consumer buys a 
half-gallon bottle then the unit volume will be 2.  This variable is used to capture 
packaging-related cost variations, as smaller package size per volume implies higher 
costs to produce, distribute, and shelve.  The variable PRDilt is the percent price reduction 
of brand i and is used to capture any costs associated with specific price reductions such 
as aisle end displays or freestanding newspaper inserts.   
 
4b. Expenditure Specification 
Similarly the reduced form expenditure function in (6) is specified as: 
(9)  lt lt lt t lt idx C wage x TR x _ ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 4 3 1 2 1 0 ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ + + + + = −  , 
where t = 1,…, 260 and ψ0 is the intercept term.  TRt is a linear trend, capturing any 
unobservable time specific effects on consumer milk expenditures.  The variable wagelt is 
the average wage rate in city l and is used as a proxy to capture the effect of income 
differences on milk purchases.  xlt-1 is lagged expenditure by one period. C_idxlt is the 
city level consumer price index; this variable captures any city level overall supply 
shocks to consumers.  
  In general the reduced form specifications, equations (8) and (9), are always 
identified, although the issue of parameter identification is rather complex in such non-  15
linear structural models.
8  We checked the order conditions for identification that would 
apply to a linearized version of the demand equations (2) and found them to be satisfied.  
Finally, we did not uncover numerical difficulties in implementing the FIML estimation.  
As pointed out by Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller (p.474-475) we interpret this as 




  Our translating specification (e.g. αilt = α0i+ ∑ =
K
1 k λik Zklt) has four quarterly 
dummies and two continuous variables.  These two variables are: the monthly wage rate 
in the city and the consumer price index.  The seasonal dummies will be able to capture 
any seasonal variations in a given city. The wage rate variable captures any impact of 
changes in income on milk consumption. And lastly the consumer price index can capture 
any exogenous shocks in other markets on the consumption of milk. 
 
5. Q-AIDS Model Estimation Results 
Table 3 provides parameter estimates for the demand system, reduced form price and 
expenditure equations.  The system is estimated with soy milk as the default equation so 
no parameters are shown for soy milk.  In total we estimate 86 parameters, 70 of them are 
significant at a 5% or better level of significance.  Among our estimated β parameters 
measuring how consumption of each milk type changes with expenditure, three of four 
are significant at a 5% level of significance with whole milk insignificant.  Of the four 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion please refer to Mittelhammer, Judge and Miller (p.474-475). 
9 Due to space limitations, we report only related econometric results. More complete reports of the results 
are available from the authors on request.    16
estimated τ parameters, which describe the quadratic term on expenditure, three of them 
are significant at the 5% level, while the τ parameter for flavored milk is insignificant.  
The significance of parameters (τ) associated with the quadratic part of the demand 
system validates the choice of a Q-AIDS formulation for demand.  
 
5a. Analysis of Elasticity Estimates:   
Table 4 presents expenditure elasticity estimates and associated standard errors 
while Tables 5(a) and 5(b) present uncompensated and compensated price elasticity 
estimates and associated standard errors.  We estimate elasticities at the mean of the 
variables and find all except two of them to be significantly different from zero at a 5% 
level or less.  The un-compensated price elasticities are not significantly different from 
the compensated ones.  Since this implies that the overall impact of per capita 
expenditure on milk consumption is minimal, the analysis of price elasticities uses un-
compensated price elasticities. 
All types of milk show, as expected, negative uncompensated own-price 
elasticities.  Of the own price effects whole milk has the highest own price elasticity (-
2.40) followed by soy milk (-1.79) and skim/lowfat milk (-1.73), with flavored milk (-
1.31) and milk shakes (-0.86) having much lower elasticities.  The key finding out of the 
price elasticity matrix is that all of the cross price effects between soy milk and other 
milk types except one (flavored milk) are less than unity, suggesting that there is 
relatively little relationship between these markets.  In contrast many of the other milk 
varieties have elastic price relationships with each other.  This suggests that purchasing   17
patterns do not show consumers treating soy milk as an equivalent type of milk with 
cows milk. 
In terms of signs, soy milk has a negative cross price elasticity with whole, 
implying they are complements to each other.  In contrast the positive cross price 
elasticity between soy milk and all other types of milk implies that soy milk is a 
substitute for them.  This substitution pattern is, however, asymmetric suggesting greater 
movement to other milk types than back to soy milk.  For example, a 1% change in the 
price of skim/lowfat milk leads to a statistically insignificant 0.01% switch to soy milk 
suggesting little substitutability between these two products.   On the other hand, a 1% 
price change in soy milk leads to only a statistically significant and similar sized 0.99% 
change in skim/lowfat milk demand and a 1.14% change in demand for flavored milk.   
This implies that consumers who have switched to the higher priced soy milk 
product are likely to switch back to cows milk.  Such fluidity in consumer behavior may 
suggest that once consumers choose soy milk they do not perceive a quality difference in 
comparison to cows milk as would be the case in a vertically differentiated product 
market.  Consumers in vertically differentiated markets do not tend to switch back to a 
lower quality product once they switch to a higher quality product.
10  This contrasts with 
results reported in Dhar and Foltz that consumers who switch to organic milk are unlikely 
to switch back.   
Among the expenditure elasticities, flavored milk (2.54) and milk shakes (3.76) 
had the highest while soy milk has the lowest (0.35) elasticity.  Skim/lowfat milk, which 
is the dominant milk in all these markets, has, as expected, an expenditure elasticity just 
                                                 
10 A classic example of vertically differentiated market is the computer chip market.  Once consumers 
switch to Pentium 4 chips they prefer not to switch back to Pentium 3 or lower quality chips.   18
above unity suggesting a necessity.  The low expenditure elasticity for soy milk is 
perhaps surprising given that the soy milk is commonly perceived to be associated with 
higher income groups of the population.  But the relationship between income and milk 
expenditure may not be positively correlated.  It is commonly known that large families 
with children tend to have higher per capita expenditure on milk.  In that case our result 
suggests that smaller families with no children would tend to consume more soy milk.    
Another possible explanation is that we are only estimating a partial demand system and 
we have not fully accounted for cross expenditure effects.  Estimates that test household 
and income effects as well as this work’s assumption of weak separability would best be 
done with household level data, which presents an important avenue for future research. 
 
6.   Estimating Consumer Benefits 
As demonstrated above, consumer willingness to pay for different types of milk 
can be estimated by the compensating variation.  This compensating variation has two 
elements a competitive effect and a variety effect.  The estimation procedure and results 
for each of these elements are described below. 
 
6a.  Competitive Effects: 
The ideal strategy for identifying the competitive effects of soy milk is to 
compare prices in markets and times in which they are sold with those where and when 
they are not offered for sale (see e.g., Hausman and Leonard).   This method provides a 
way to value consumer surplus from soy milk by observing the effects of the product 
introduction on prices of cows milk, which is the competition effect (CE).  If the   19
introduction of soy milk reduces the price of cows milk, then consumers benefit from the 
competition even if they do not purchase soy milk.  This competition effect would be 
over and above the benefit, utility, gained by those who consume soy milk which is 
described by the variety effect.   
Unfortunately, the data set does not include sufficient observations of markets 
with no soy milk sales to capture product introductions.  We instead use the introduction 
of additional soy milk brands as a proxy for this product introduction effect.  Since the 
effect of a product introduction should normally be larger than the effect of a brand 
introduction into an existing product category, these estimates should be seen as lower 
bounds on the effects of soy milk being in the market.  For the competitive effects 
analysis we use data from all 12 cities over 260 weeks in order to capture the maximum 
level of variation in the sample.  Overall there were an average of 8 soy milk brands in 
each city, with a maximum of 19 and a minimum during a 40 week period in the second 
year of our data, 1998, when the So_2 city had no soy milk brands in the market.  In 
contrast there were an average of 17 skim/lowfat milk brands and 11 whole milk brands.   
We estimate the price equation searching for price effects in the dominant type of 
milk, skim milk which represents an average of at least 58% of the market share in all 
cities.  Following Hausman and Leonard let the pricing equation for skim milk be 
described in the following manner: 
(10) 
it i it
it it it it t it
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ε δ δ δ
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The dependent variable is the price of milk in city i during week t.  The time specific 
effects in the market are captured by the 0-1 indicator variables for each of 260 weeks, 
Wt.  In order to account for fixed effects in each market, the error structure is assumed to   20
include a city specific effect νi and a mean zero error term µit.  The variable Iit is a count 
of the number of soy brands in the market as a way of capturing the effects of an 
introduction of soy milk.  Thus, the coefficient δ1 represents the lower bound on the 
competitive effect (CE), the change in price with the introduction of labeled milk having 
controlled for city and time specific effects.   The variable Bit represents the number of 
skim milk brands in a city during a particular week while Cit counts the number of other, 
non-skim and non-soy, brands in the market.  These latter two variables control for the 
general effects of brand introduction in the estimation. 
The equation is estimated using weekly prices per gallon of skim milk across each 
of 12 cities as the dependent variable.  Results for the key parameters of interest are 
presented in Table 6. The estimated competition effect is strong with skim milk prices 
shown to be decreasing in the total number of brands, as well as the number of skim milk 
brands.  In contrast the estimated effect of soy milk on skim milk prices is negligible, less 
than 1/3 of a penny per gallon, and statistically insignificant.  We find no evidence of 
there being a strong effect of soy milk brand introductions on the prices of skim milk.
11 
 
6b. Variety effect:   
As mentioned above we use our demand system parameter estimates to measure 
variety effects for the existence of soy milk in the market.  Table 7 presents estimates of 
the virtual prices, which are the prices at which quantity purchased would be driven to 
zero, and the variety effects consumers receive from having soy milk in the market.
12  We 
                                                 
11 Estimates with whole milk showed a significant coefficient equivalent to 1.3 cents per gallon from the 
introduction of soy milk brands.  The results are available from the authors on request. 
12 Results are not presented for milkshake milk the estimates proved unreliable due to the low market 
shares for this product.   21
estimate the virtual price of a milk type by solving our estimated Q-AIDS setting the 
budget share of the milk type to zero.  They are presented in relative terms to the 
product’s average price, so that a virtual price of 1.93 for whole milk says that at 1.93 
times the average whole milk price of $3.15, or $6.08, the demand for whole milk would 
go to zero. 
The virtual prices show some important differences between the virtual prices of 
milk types.  There is clearly much more pricing power in flavored milk than any other 
type of milk.  Both skim and soy milk have similar relative virtual prices of around three 
and a half times current average prices, although one should note that they imply very 
different prices that set demand to zero: $11.08 for skim milk and $27.54 for soy milk. 
From the virtual prices and the estimated demand surface curvatures one can 
calculate the variety effect, which, averaged across the four cities, is 1.3 cents per capita 
per gallon per week.  This implies a representative consumer across these four cities 
receives 1.3 cents worth of benefit per week just from the option of having soy milk in 
his/her choice set.  There are, however, significant variations at the city level.  The 
highest per capita variety effect is in a western city, WT_4, (2.4 cents per week), and the 
lowest is in a northeastern city, NE_1, (0.8 cents per week).  These estimates from the 
variety effect are very small, especially when compared to results reported in Dhar and 
Foltz that show a variety effect from organic and rBST-free milk that at 17 cents is an 
order of magnitude higher.     
 
7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications   22
In this paper we investigated consumer benefits from having soy milk in the 
market using retail price differentials and a quadratic version of the almost ideal demand 
system in a revealed preference analysis.  This work finds consumers pay significantly 
more for soy milk but the average consumer derives relatively little benefit from having 
soy milk in the market.  While the results show that nationally consumers benefit both 
from the competition induced by labeled milk and by the benefits of an increased choice 
set, these effects are fairly small.   
  These results shed some light on whether dairy farmers and processors should be 
concerned about the in-roads that soy milk is making in the milk market.   While it seems 
clear that consumers derive benefits from being able to buy soy milk it does not seem to 
be a major competitor for cows’ milk.   This presents a cautionary tale to policy makers 
considering creating barriers to soy milk market entry such as denying soy milk access to 
dairy case shelf space: these efforts may not be worth the consumer benefits. 
  A number of productive avenues for future research remain for investigation.  It 
would be useful to investigate the demand for soy milk in the context of the demand for 
organic and rBST-free cows’ milk since the soy milk market is dominated by organic and 
genetically modified soy-free soy milk brands.  In addition organic soy milk has a much 
higher market share than organic cows’ milk.   Finally the market for soy milk has 
significant scope for non-competitive behaviors with its concentration of market share 
held by a few major food and dairy companies.  This is a line of research we plan to 
investigate in the future.   23
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Table 1: Average Milk Price and Market Share  
 Price  Market  Share 
     Mean   std. Dev     Mean   std. Dev 
Skim/Low Fat Milk  3.0864 0.3318 0.6478 0.0745
Whole Milk  3.1468 0.3372 0.2878 0.0764
Flavored Milk  5.1425 1.0438 0.053 0.0326
Milk Shakes  8.9359 6.5389 0.003 0.0018
Soy Milk  8.0293 1.4225 0.0084 0.0078
 
Table 2: Average Milk Price and Market Share by City 
 Price  Market  Share 
     Mean   std. Dev     Mean  std. Dev 
  SO_1 
Skim/Low Fat Milk  3.1626 0.3292 0.5903 0.023
Whole Milk  3.1251 0.3007 0.3256 0.0099
Flavored Milk  4.3853 0.5107 0.0747 0.0227
Milk Shakes  2.4245 0.3065 0.0033 0.0017
Soy Milk  8.3633 2.0716 0.0061 0.0068
  NE_1  
Skim/Low Fat Milk  2.8981 0.2844 0.6581 0.0305
Whole Milk  2.897 0.2285 0.292 0.0125
Flavored Milk  5.1546 0.8829 0.0406 0.0386
Milk Shakes  11.261 2.1056 0.0009 0.0004
Soy Milk  7.9602 1.2069 0.0084 0.009
  WT_1 
Skim/Low Fat Milk  3.2764 0.1453 0.5854 0.0183
Whole Milk  3.0771 0.2043 0.3675 0.0172
Flavored Milk  6.406 0.5794 0.0322 0.0173
Milk Shakes  4.2938 0.2562 0.0048 0.0008
Soy Milk  7.2289 0.2672 0.0101 0.0075
  WT_4 
Skim/Low Fat Milk  3.0086 0.3841 0.7573 0.0334
Whole Milk  3.488 0.2947 0.1662 0.0147
Flavored Milk  4.6242 0.7395 0.0647 0.0275
Milk Shakes  17.7645 4.3661 0.0029 0.0011
Soy Milk  8.5647 1.1182 0.0089 0.0072
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Demand Equations  Estimates t-stat  Price and Expenditure 
Equation 
Estimates t-stat 
Quarterly Binary 1 in S/L Milk  0.97 6.49  Intercept: S/L  -0.64 -8.81 
Quarterly Binary 2 in S/L Milk  0.98 6.52  Intercept: W  -0.41 -5.62 
Quarterly Binary 3 in S/L Milk  0.98 6.52  Intercept: FL  -0.45 -5.05 
Quarterly Binary 4 in S/L Milk  0.96 6.37  Intercept: MS  -0.95 -4.89 
Wage in S/L Milk  -0.90 -12.11  Intercept: Soy  0.33 5.20 
CPI in S/L Milk  0.58 3.16  Coop Milk Price: S/L  0.00 -0.03 
Quarterly Binary 1 in W Milk  2.04 15.39  Coop Milk Price: W  -0.05 -0.77 
Quarterly Binary 2 in W Milk  2.03 15.35  Coop Milk Price: FL  -0.07 -0.65 
Quarterly Binary 3 in W Milk  2.03 15.31  Coop Milk Price: MS  -0.17 -1.09 
Quarterly Binary 4 in W Milk  2.03 15.29  Coop Milk Price: Soy  0.02 0.26 
Wage in W Milk  0.87 12.80  Wage Rate: S/L Milk  0.19 11.39 
CPI in W Milk  -2.64 -15.72  Wage Rate: W Milk  0.13 7.58 
Quarterly Binary 1 in FL Milk  -1.24 -10.49  Wage Rate: FL Milk  0.17 8.02 
Quarterly Binary 2 in FL Milk  -1.23 -10.50  Wage Rate: MS Milk  0.27 5.87 
Quarterly Binary 3 in FL Milk  -1.23 -10.51  Wage Rate: Soy Milk  -0.02 -1.16 
Quarterly Binary 4 in FL Milk  -1.21 -10.27  1 period lagged Price: S/L  0.73 68.56 
Wage in FL Milk  0.13 2.92  1 period lagged Price: W  0.78 91.15 
CPI in FL Milk  1.17 8.99  1 period lagged Price: FL  0.77 60.66 
Quarterly Binary 1 in MS Milk  -0.03 -2.89  1 period lagged Price: MS  0.86 124.87 
Quarterly Binary 2 in MS Milk  -0.03 -2.83  1 period lagged Price: Soy  0.72 87.52 
Quarterly Binary 3 in MS Milk  -0.03 -2.82  Percentage Price Reduction: S/L  -0.02 -17.43 
Quarterly Binary 4 in MS Milk  -0.03 -2.91  Percentage Price Reduction: W  -0.01 -11.89 
Wage in MS Milk  0.02 3.40  Percentage Price Reduction: FL  -0.04 -12.41 
CPI in MS Milk  0.02 1.11  Percentage Price Reduction: MS  -0.02 -6.04 
β in S/L Milk  -0.07 -2.93  Percentage Price Reduction: Soy  -0.02 -8.70 
β in W Milk  -0.01 -0.30  Unit per Volume: S/L  -0.18 -9.29 
β in FL Milk  0.06 3.98  Unit per Volume: W  -0.15 -13.61 
β in MS Milk  0.02 10.38  Unit per Volume: FL  -0.24 -12.41 
τ in S/L Milk  -0.26 -5.26  Unit per Volume: MS  -0.22 -19.01 
τ in W Milk  0.27 7.15  Unit per Volume: Soy  -0.25 -24.56 
τ in FL Milk  -0.04 -1.30  Coop Milk Price
2: S/L  0.06 0.65 
τ in MS Milk  0.02 4.74  Coop Milk Price
2: W  0.10 1.05 
Γ11  -0.44 -14.10  Coop Milk Price
2: FL  0.16 1.13 
Γ21  0.44 16.19  Coop Milk Price
2: MS  0.19 0.85 
Γ22  -0.44 -16.53  Coop Milk Price
2: Soy  -0.03 -0.30 
Γ31  -0.03 -2.63  Expenditure Function    
Γ32  0.03 3.31  Intercept  -4.05 -4.47 
Γ33  -0.01 -1.32  Time trend  -0.03 -3.30 
Γ41  0.02 12.43  1 period lagged expenditure  1.07 55.26 
Γ42  -0.02 -14.43  wage rate  0.00 0.01 
Γ43  0.00 3.36  CPI  0.58 2.85 
Γ44  0.00 2.43         27
Table 4: Expenditure Elasticities*  
Product Estimates 
Skim/Low Fat Milk  1.08
  50.30
Whole Milk  0.52
  11.98
Flavored Milk  2.54
  14.53
Milk Shakes  3.76
  13.49
Soy Milk  0.35
 1.99
* Italicized numbers below the estimates are t-stats. 











Skim/Low Fat Milk  -1.73 0.66 -0.05 0.02 0.01 
  -40.28 14.60 -3.03 12.18 1.64 
Whole Milk  1.84 -2.40 0.12 -0.06 -0.03 
  23.69 -23.90 4.77 -14.00 -2.38 
Flavored Milk  -1.51 0.08 -1.31 0.03 0.16 
  -6.80 0.47 -9.15 2.43 8.98 
Milk Shakes  2.82 -6.75 0.48 -0.86 0.25 
  5.98 -15.13 2.79 -13.19 2.55 
Soy Milk  0.99 -0.89 1.14 0.10 -1.79 
 2.63 -2.11 10.82 2.84  -19.23 
* Italicized numbers below the estimates are t-stats. 











Skim/Low Fat Milk  -1.70 0.68 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
  -37.03 15.88 -2.83 12.28 1.72 
Whole Milk  1.75 -2.44 0.12 -0.06 -0.03 
  21.59 -24.99 4.48 -14.09 -2.48 
Flavored Milk  -1.46 0.10 -1.30 0.03 0.16 
  -6.67 0.61 -9.11 2.45 9.04 
Milk Shakes  2.82 -6.74 0.48 -0.86 0.25 
  5.99 -15.13 2.79 -13.18 2.55 
Soy Milk  0.98 -0.90 1.14 0.10 -1.79 
  2.62 -2.12 10.82 2.84 -19.23 
 * Italicized numbers below the estimates are t-stats.   28
Table 6: Reduced Form Price Model - Fixed Effects  
 
Dependent variable: 
Price of skim milk  Estimates  t-stat 
Soy brands  -0.0034  -1.15 
Skim brands  -0.0053  -2.63 
Total other brands in market  -0.014  -8.78 
Constant 4.27  41.12 
N=3120, no. of groups=12; R-square:  0.75 
Note: Equation includes 259 weekly dummy variables 
 





















SO_1  3.47 2.14 68.07 2.61 0.014
NE_1   3.13 1.85  8.84 3.76 0.008
WT_1  3.31 2.36 23.40 3.69 0.013
WT_4  4.34 1.65  135.60 3.82 0.024
All 
Cities 
3.59 1.93 39.79 3.43 0.013
 